

Specificity of the Treatment of the real: subjects of the social and dissident links

Naranjo Orozco, J. A.¹

Abstract

The one called by some authors "psi field" includes areas such as clinical psychology, educational psychology, the interrelation between these, neurosciences, psychiatry, psychopharmacology ... it is a field and discourse born within the positivism that has been shaping and trapping to other currents, mainly to hermeneutics and, to a large extent, to psychoanalysis itself.

In this article I clarify the specificity of psychoanalysis, more precisely that of the clinic of the real with respect to that of the psi field. Furthermore, I offer a renewal of the specificity of the treatment of the real in the occupation of the subjects of the social and proposing the formalization of two new discourses or social links from psychoanalysis; each looking at the de - marginalization of psychoanalysis as a mere area of the psi field and the promotion of the social presence of psychoanalysis as a discourse that encourages and supports the properly social bond that contrasts with the bond, in the narcissistic background, that it corresponds to the social base of the psi field.

Keywords: *psi field; positivism; hermeneutics; treatment of the real; social bond.*

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¹ Centro Universitario Emmanuel Kant, Ciudad de México, Mexico

Corresponding author: Julián Andrés Naranjo Orozco, jlnaranjo@hotmail.com

Introduction

This work begins with the question about the specificity of the treatment or clinic of the real, which corresponds to Lacan's last teaching, regarding the specificity of the contemporary psi field, understood as a complex network of positivist and hermeneutical currents that encompasses the capitalist social function of curing and educating in the manner of the biological model.

The work gives an account of the aforementioned specificity of the treatment or clinic of the real compared to that of the psi field and is justified in its contribution consisting of de-marginalizing the field of action of the clinic of the real, not only by dis-confusing its specificity of that of the psi field, but also by renewing the very specificity of the clinic of the real in the social.

The methodology is based on the perspective of the critical theory of society (Frankfurt School) both in the contrasting of specificities and in the elucidations on the social basis of the psi field and what would become the effective presence (*wirklichkeit*) of psychoanalysis in the social.

In psychoanalysis as well as in philosophy and epistemology, it is not appropriate to treat notions as concepts, as closed categories, this annihilates the very notions that in these fields must continue as such. For this reason, the article has the following paragraph organization:

Positivism and hermeneutics roughly define these two currents, and the paragraph on psi field defines it as a framework of positivism and hermeneutics.

In the paragraph "Psychoanalysis" I offer some nuances of notions of psychoanalysis that are essential for the argumentation of this work. I deal with everything related to psychoanalysis from my particular reading of Lacan's work.

The paragraph "Psychoanalysis in specificity other than the psi field" is made up of clinical vignettes with which more notions of psychoanalysis are clarified, the positivist and hermeneutical currents in the psi field to be considered are succinctly defined and, incidentally, I define my position in front of them from my reading of psychoanalysis and supporting a specificity of psychoanalysis, more precisely of the clinic of the real, in distinction to the psi field.

In the paragraph "On the social base of the psi field", I present this base mainly from my reading of the work of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer "Dialectic of the illustration". I also offer my definition of what would be the dominant social bond and corresponding to the psi field at its social base. Also, in that section, I am giving some nuances on what would be the dissident social links corresponding to the clinic of the real.

In the paragraph "The social presence of psychoanalysis", I argue about the subjects who have to be involved in the role of analyst: clinical, discursive and political; these are the subjects of the social.

The paragraph "Make to hysterical discourse and the impossible to make delirious" collects some propositions that have been reached in the work to develop them a little more and thus offer more propositions, among these, the formalization of two new discourses: "the impossible of making delirious"

in terms of the analyst's effective link (*wirklichkeit*) with the subjects of the social, and the “social link” that promotes and underpins psychoanalysis, in contrast to the narcissistic link corresponding to the psi field.

The final comment emphasizes the distinction of the specificity of psychoanalysis with respect to that of the psi field.

Positivism

I define it in a broad meaning of the term that not only includes classical positivism, but also all logical empiricism or neopositivism. For this reason, this work begins by assuming, as Max Horkheimer did in 1937, positivism as well as all the traditional theory of modern science that was already taking its general outlines from Henri de Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, or even from Francis Bacon. Just agreeing with this broad meaning of positivism as a traditional theory of science born in modernity, it should be clarified that said conceptualization would certainly encompass the various authors who, although they have not formally belonged to the *Vienna Circle* or any of the propelling groups of the proposal of the traditional theory, are associated with it, would encompass the contemporary developments of the traditional theory that are supported by probabilistics through the use of confidence intervals of inferential statistics.

Positivism alludes to merely developmental or progressive models (Emmanuele, 1998). It is characteristic of all traditional theory of modern science to refer that valid knowledge is that which has all empirical bases and this principle is impregnated with the extraction of knowledge from said base from the modern instrumental reason, namely, from knowledge as that which implements the

world (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944/1972). Every positivist current is distinguished by establishing, epistemologically, an independence of the facts, of a reality, with respect to the theories that would have the function of apprehending, in a descriptive, explanatory, causative and predictive way, these facts and the relationships between them (Habermas, 1967/1988). Neopositivism believes in a logic that corresponds to independent reality, with which that reality can be apprehended (Horkheimer, 1937/1982) Philosophers close to the Vienna circle, led by Ludwig Wittgenstein, believed that language also contains a pragmatic structure that it would allow to differentiate the clearly significant and expressible (according to independent reality) from the vague and meaningless (Wittgenstein, 1953). Many other philosophers, also close to logical positivism, some represented by Karl Popper and his tradition, defend methods of investigation or verification, such as Popperian falsification or classical experimental methods, without any contemplation or consideration for the particularities of their objects of study (Adorno, 1961/1976)

Hermeneutics

The origin of hermeneutics in philosophy and social sciences dates back to biblical exegetes who made great efforts to recover the archaeological, artistic and literary information of a certain text, from the old or from the new testament, reading it between the lines. The intention was thus to recover the moment in which a community produced the religious text, to capture the situation of the text in the community, to capture the meaning function of the text within the community, to apprehend the place occupied by the text in the life of the community (Vasco, 1990).

From this origin in the biblical exegetes, hermeneutics passed to the study of literary texts and to the field of the "sciences of the spirit" with precursors such as Wilhelm Dilthey. The different authors and precursors of hermeneutics support it as the paradigm according to the social and human sciences, and their actions have been fundamentally that of the biblical exegetes already exposed. It has had great representatives such as Hans-Georg Gadamer.

Hermeneutics has come into action when some difficulty arises in the apprehension of the meaning of vital manifestations or some disorder in the consensus of intersubjective communication (Jensen, 1984).

At present, the historical-hermeneutical sciences are directed to locate the social or individual praxis in the historical process, as well as to orient said praxis. The historical-hermeneutical sciences have, therefore, history as their axis and emphasize the interpretation of the situation (hermeneutics), the giving of an "all with meaning" as an orientation of the praxis (Vasco, 1990). A sociologist could locate the peasantry of yesterday and today in the municipality of Oaxaca de Juárez and want to guide the work of the peasant of today and tomorrow in that locality; In this way, he undertakes the reconstruction of the whole - with - meaning of the peasant family of the last century of Oaxaca de Juárez.

Hermeneutics assumes the transparency of language in its communication but taking into account that language certainly grows semantically and that tradition always dominates and is present (Gadamer, 1960/1989) Thus, natural language is, at the same time, its own metalanguage and communicates beyond our horizon of understanding, generating discord in intersubjective communication and disorientation in praxis. Hermeneutics points

towards the broadening of understanding through *Horizontverschmelzung* (fusion of horizons), taking up the tradition, the history, of the other part of the link, in fusion with the tradition itself, and thus giving itself an understanding more in line with the metalanguage; an interpretation that clarifies vital phenomena, reestablishes the consensus of intersubjective communication and reorients praxis.

But in addition to the hermeneutical currents that derive from Gadamer's proposal, there are many currents such as the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida. Derridian deconstruction, inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure's linguistic-structuralist proposal that language is differences, proposes *différance*, a French neologism that connotes presence - absence and deferred presence (Derrida, 1968/2016). *Différance* is proper to the thing itself and there is no subject that can be an immediate starting point for the constitution of the world. To fall into such a presupposition would be like postulating a transcendent meaning. From this angle, there is nothing outside the text and since there is no transcendent meaning, all text can be infinitely deconstructed, the meanings of a text can be innumerable.

Deconstruction appears first in the field of literary criticism, but Jacques Derrida himself raised it as a philosophical criticism, dissolving the distinction between literature and philosophy. It follows from this initiative that some sympathize with the deconstructive proposal in the field of psychoanalysis.

The psi field

It is a notion that alludes to a wide field of action and disciplines linked to positivism, with a historical mission, precisely, of providing services to the double social action of ed-

ucating and healing with a medical and biological connotation, which would also define under those parameters what is assumed as mental and emotional health equating to “physical” health. The psi field as a dominant discourse since the dawn of modern States and a discourse that is positioned beyond the speakers, as it speaks to its speakers, expands its undergrowth and permeates the other discourses that, after all, also transcend its speakers (Emmanuelle, 1998, 2002). This is how the discourse of many psychoanalysts and many other discourses that early or from the very beginning did not emerge, in a forceful way, under the positivist framework (such as the hermeneutic), in any case, they end up being absorbed, assimilated, to the discourse of the psi field and its function: to educate and heal “biologically” (Emmanuelle, 2002). The psi field is, then, an intersection of medical and pedagogical discourse, both discourses that end up being absorbed too.

In this work I will refer to some currents and disciplines sheltered under the psi field, both on the positivist side and on the hermeneutical side. From the first I will refer to behaviorism in its three generations, to neurosciences and pharmacology; from the second, to the deconstruction improperly led towards psychoanalysis and the systemic-post-rationalist model of Vittorio Guidano. I clarify in passing that a perspective such as first-generation behaviorism does not cease to belong to the psi field, no matter how much it “offends” its followers to be classified under this heading. It is precisely the energetic denial of first-generation behaviorists of everything that “psi” connotes that makes them prey to the term as it has been defined in this section.

Psychoanalysis

The unconscious is a structure with a strange temporality for the self; its apparition is strange, its disappearance is strange. We are always subject to it. At a certain time, it takes us away from that unity that we assume as self and the subject appears, that subject to it appears.

The unconscious is of another temporality, it is a structure, a combinatorial game of signifiers, of traces of the material, and it is, in that meaning, that it is structured as a language (Lacan, 1964/2007).

The unconscious that appears and disappears are findings that, if taken letter by letter (Allouch, 1984), are writing of different things that require realization, they are the desire that is not exhausted in a single letter, they are the desire that is intrinsically metonymic and that it is not placed on the ego identifications but on the identifications with the symptom; the symptom is, therefore, irreducible (Lacan, 1977/2008)

The real: I start from conceiving, as Jacques Lacan expressed it since 1969, that “the impossible is the real” (Lacan, 2006, p. 178). There is no signifier that by itself represents the subject; the speaking being goes in pursuit of recovering the being that does not have (the impossible) because it is a speaker and, thus, what is found constitutes a limit to the symbolic and the representativity of the imaginary. This is how the real is, in addition, what does not cease not to be written (Lacan, 2007) and the lack is configured to how the “symbolization” of the real is carried out.

Symbolic: It refers to our psychic plane, of experience, tending to the materialization of desire in and through the field of language, discursive. It alludes to our insertion into language, law and culture via the paternal metaphor, the names of the father; it evokes the split subject (Lacan, 1955/1984).

Imaginary: It refers to our psychic plane, of experience, specular and characterized by closure, by the tendency to completeness (impossible), to inhabit the apparently sealed field of images and / or myth (Lacan, 1974 / 2009).

The psychoanalytic treatment: It is the theorization of the effects of analytic practice, it is what the analyst theorizes as a reflection about his practice (Cansina, 2008) From this perspective the treatment, practice and theory make up a Borromean knot in which the detachment of any of its three conformations is the detachment of all the others. The practice corresponds to the intimacy of the act where the analysis is exercised and as a thing in itself it is ungraspable, it is part of the real (see definition of the real). The treatment would correspond to the always limited symbolization of analytic practice, while the theory implies the argumentative closure (in this it would correspond to the imaginary). The treatment as theorization of the effects of practice moves the theoretical closure, while the practice as impossible moves the treatment (Cancina, 2008)

Treatment focused on the real: It is, of course, based on the definition that the theorization of the effects of analytic practice are impossible; but above all it pretends to be the theorization of the effects of a practice that in its execution it assumes the lack of the subject, not only from the tendency to close of the imaginary, but also from the limitation of the symbolic (language and the Other is also at lack). The treatment focused on the real points to the act, valuing the non-reciprocity between the specular (gaze), the symbolic and the act (Cancina, 2008; Leff, 2011).

The direction of the cure: The unconscious itself poses a fundamental division to

the self-conceived as a unit. The subject involves a cleavage, a fundamental division and the recognition of the fundamental division, as the apparition of the subject (subjected to the unconscious), is of the order of the recognition of castration and towards this the direction of the cure points. On the other side, there would be to belie to the fundamental division, the splitting of the subject (Bruno, 2013). Recognition of castration goes hand in hand with identification with the symptom.

The logical time and the assertion of anticipated certainty: Some believe that it alludes only to a logical time of the collectivity, but the truth is that it alludes to the time of all the psychic occurrence, even to the time of the analysis. It is about an unsolvable sophism that, at the same time, presents infinite solutions. A prison warden brings three inmates to him and tells them that, for a reason he cannot reveal, he has to release one of them. To decide which prisoner to release, he proposes a test: they being three inmates, five discs are available, three of which are white and two are black. The director does not tell the inmates which disc he puts each on his back and exhorts them that the first of them to walk through the door with a logical, and not probabilistic, conclusion about the color of his disc will be released. Of course, there are no mirrors so that inmates cannot observe the disc on their back, nor can they communicate with each other about the disc they would carry (Lacan, 1945/2003).

This sophistry implies moments of the gaze (of looking at the other's back) - imaginary -, times of reflection, of understanding, of inquiring what the other person might be thinking that I am thinking, of inquiring about the signs, the clues that could reveal what color of the disc is the one that is carried - symbolic -, and moments of act, of being the

first to cross the door, of concluding - the real. The range of solutions of this sophism is infinite, some solutions can be with the symbolic and the real very bent to the imaginary, with the imaginary and the real very bent to the symbolic, etc. The solutions may vary in how much is recognized or denied about the non-correspondence between the moment of the gaze, the time to understand and the moment to conclude. For example, after a long time of understanding, the irresolution of sophistry by via reflection can be recognized (recognition of castration) and arrive at the desire, the act, crossing the door, or one could continue to believe it and stay in a more symbolic solution, of thought, like obsessive.

Psychoanalysis in specificity other than the psi field (deconstruction, behaviorism, systemic model - post-rationalist, neurosciences and psychopharmacology)

I begin by considering a case of the analyst Jorge Reitter.

A very intelligent lawyer comes for consultation. He claims that he is active all the time, occupies a high position in a very powerful corporation, trains permanently, and on weekends ... he gets bored. "I don't like a law degree, but I had an honorary degree. Seen from the outside my career seems good to me, from the inside it seems like a shit" (Reitter, 2019, p. 1).

He maintains that he wants to find things that take him away from the word for the word itself; the analyst agrees and adds that speaking is very important but insofar as the word leads to the act and is not a resource to avoid it. This lawyer complains of being under an excess of responsibilities. When it comes to independent projects, he fantasizes

about ventures and finds out, and informs himself, and meets, finally he never comes to anything. His father is also a lawyer in a small inland town, and the idea of going back there to take over his father's study hangs over him all the time. "In L. (that city where his father is) there are many decisions that are not made, that have already been made" (Reitter, 2019, p. 2).

In his days as a university student, he approached theater, poetry, philosophy, everything that constitutes what he calls "my dark side". At a time when something emerged from his relationship with the theater, he says: "I am afraid of getting hooked on the theater, the creative, and disengaging myself from the formal, the productive, not complying with an image. I am afraid of losing a freedom, but it is a virtual freedom, a freedom that I never enjoy" (Reitter, 2019, p. 2).

Reitter comments:

As is generally the case, here one could substitute fear for desire, desire for a jouissance that threatens the self. And that enjoyment would necessarily imply an act, the one that appears metaphorized as disengagement. With a very correct perception of what is at stake, he establishes that this disengagement implies not complying with an image, which alludes both to the fall of an identification and that of the imaginary complete Other (Reitter, 2019, p. 2).

It is clear that, for Reitter, that symptom of fear of being hooked on the theater with the consequent loss without turning back of a freedom that he hoists, although it is certainly not for him, designates the desire of his analyst and lawyer, the desire to move towards the paths of the theater. The analysis implies that for the analyst and his identifications of the self fall and that this works in favor of an identifi-

cation with the symptom, that is, with his desire. This is the unexpected and surprising thing that gives analysis its hallmark! The identifications of the self fall in favor of identification with the symptom is a fall from the illusion of unity and integrity of the self in favor of the emergence of the subject, from being subject to the symptom, to the unconscious.

Reitter also makes the following two points about this lawyer's case:

Like so many people, as successful as he is in his career, he never chose his. Sure, choosing his would have been an act, but instead of choosing his career, or choosing law as his career, he chose his father's career. But in that sentence, he chose the career of his father, the verb to choose means the opposite, it means that he chose not to choose [...] (Reitter, 2019, p. 1).

Does he want to take over his father's study? None of that, it is like something that is not questioned, like a mandate that is not very well known where it comes from, because he does not even assign it to the father. With a very fine grasp he manages to locate his source in what he reads in what was put into question by the father. Furthermore, as he says, 'in L. there are many decisions that are not made, that have already been made' (Reitter, 2019, p. 2)

The identification with the symptom is what designates the path of desire, of the effective choice (*Wirklichkeit*), of the singular of the subject against the ego and superego identifications of the father's desire and rooted in a complete imaginary Other.

Let us consider two more points from Reitter about this same case:

Thinking it over, obsessive neurosis is like a great parody of the act, it is a great pretend that there is an act, and this must have, like the symptom, a double face, a defense against the act and a reminder of that act that permanently pulses through come to be realized. Curiously, the first thing this patient said when I asked him what brought him was that he was overwhelmed by an excess of responsibility. True and false. He fills himself with responsibilities to avoid the responsibility he has, the one he has with his own life. 'I do things as if they had no consequences and as if time did not pass' [...] (Reitter, 2019, p. 2).

He captures it very well, corporations make no one ultimately responsible for anything, so even though he spends his time fantasizing about independent ventures, and finds out, and gets informed, and meets, in the end he never comes to anything. The act supposes being left without the corporation, without the general, the teacher, or any form of guarantee that allows neurotic anonymity. That is why the theme of the act is central to the analysis: the analyst will be another incarnation of the guarantor Other that it is necessary to lose in order to achieve and sustain the act itself, thus we could read the resolution of what Freud called transference neurosis. How many times do the analysands ask when we are going to discharge them; I remember one who had the fantasy that I was going to give him a diploma, something like a normality degree (Reitter, 2019, p. 3).

The identification with the symptom, the desire, implies the act, that act of responsibility with one's own life that is, paradoxically, the act without guarantees, the act that is not rooted in a complete imaginary Other. It is in this sense the desire that the act implies, the moment of concluding of the logical times, implies that "the die is cast".

Like the inmates of that situation of the writing "*The logical time and the assertion of anticipated certainty*" (Lacan, 1945/2003), there is no reciprocity or synchrony between thought and act. The act of desire, that is, the act of the subject, is without guarantor and all of us - the inmates - from the perspective of analysis must take the step in this way, leaving the sophistry which at the level of thought, of the symbolic, it is unsolvable. This is the stamp of the real that concerns desire, the analytic treatment; this is the treatment of the real put into play.

Reitter mentions that "I remember a patient who had done an analysis several times a week for many years and his neurosis was still intact" (Reitter, 2019, p. 3). Because certainly if there are no conclusive acts in the analysis, it is because certainly the dimension of desire is not being played, that is, identification with the symptom is not being played. One would not be in psychoanalysis but, perhaps, in some sort of the many variants of hermeneutics, of which the endless deconstructivism of Jacques Derrida is still one of them.

The paradox of desire is that while it is true that it is infinite, endless, it is also true of conclusive moments; it is "the terminable and interminable analysis" feature of psychoanalysis and not the notion of a reality conceived only as text, although it is alleged that this is infinitely "deconstructable."

If desire is infinite and at the same time conclusive in acts, in objects, it is because, certainly as Lacan contributed, the object of desire is metonymic; castration is constitutive of desire itself (picois itself lacks a lack). The object of desire was named by Lacan as object a (alpha) because it is the object that is the cause of all our mobility. We move pushed by a lacking object, which uncompletes us, and in our direction determined by that object

one or the other is certainly reached, which implies, at the same time, a new resignification of the object as missing. In the analysis, the analysand recognizes that the lacking object is always re-signified, he recognizes the object a (recognition of castration), and the analyst is, of course, a prior and constant recognizer of his own object a. (Lacan, 1963/2007).

The act has usually been seen in negative terms, acting out, passage to the act, but the act of desire, of the subject, is decisive and constitutive of the analysis. With regard to the three logical times (the moment of the gaze, the time to understand and the moment to conclude) not everything will have to be, of course, acts of the subject, but these are decisive, and, by the way and as already guessed, the acts of the end of the analysis are fundamental.

The final acts of analysis, as Reitter argues well, allude to the resolution of the transference neurosis on the part of the analysand. I now refer to a case of Eduardo Urbaj and his considerations on this subject of the final of analysis.

As Urbaj tells us, the transfer is like a prison, like the one from which there was the possibility of being released in the aforementioned "*The logical times and the assertion of anticipated certainty*". Since the transference in the analysis is the product of the analyst's analytical act, the analyst himself being an unconscious formation of the analysand, the end of the analysis implies how to heal from the analyst (Urbaj, 2013). It is true that the actions of the subject entail changes in the analysand's life, but the rod with which the completion of an analysis is estimated must, of course, be the output of the transference that, although it made possible changes in the analysand's life,

will have to be concluded by the same apparition in scene of the subject of the analysand and not by his ego or / and the analyst's ego. The exit of the transference is the exit of the central axis product of the analytical act and frames the changes that have been generated in the real, symbolic and imaginary of the analysand via that particular analysis.

Urbaj brings us to account a case of an analysand who requested analysis, she was in a masochistic position. In the most diverse spheres (family, work, social) she was subjected, inhibited, silent, powerless, paralyzed. After ten years of analysis, this woman came out of that position of masochistic jouissance and found herself in a different way. However, submission, inhibition, paralysis, and impotence remained concentrated in the transfer (Urbaj, 2013)

The analysand woke up in anguish the day she had an analysis session and these were charged with hostility. The gaze of the analysand was at all times on the analyst and the moment of "I am not coming again" to the analysis was an articulation that took this woman a year and a half (Urbaj, 2013)

Transfer involves putting on the body and playing the scene. Wearing the masks that the analysand adheres to the analyst but precisely the analyst himself does not have to identify himself with any of those masks; the analyst moves from these imaginary, specular positions and the analysand is referred to the metonymic object. But there is a moment in the transference in which the analysand refers to the analyst's metonymic object, a moment in which she constantly scrutinizes the analyst under the assumption that he would contain the desired object to be found. It is the moment when the analyst will have to endure the transference, not fall into temptation, let go of carrying what the analysand fancifully assigns

him. The analysand will have to arrive at that there is nothing to find in the analyst, that the analyst's *object a* only concerns the analyst as well as the object a of him (the analysand) only concerns himself (Leff, 2011). Here the conclusive moment of identification with the symptom would be given, in the analysand, concerning a certain analysis.

During the course of an analysis, various changes may have occurred in the life of an analysand, but if said analysand identifies himself to the object a of the analyst, this is, of course, a being more on the side of ego identifications than of identification with the symptom. In the case of Urbaj considered here, the analysand still referred to the object a of the analyst and attributed to this object those attributes to which she submitted. In a certain session the analysand addresses the analyst with a "I will not come again, I don't know, maybe one day I will call you if there are somethings pending and I want to talk," to which Urbaj's reaction was to tell the analysand not to contact another analyst, that in the analyzes there are always transference leftovers and that, as regards her particular analysis with her, the conclusion value of the analysis is that when the analysand says that she no longer attends the analysis, that assertion is really complied.

Urbaj comments that the analysand expected him to tell her "Okay, if you are tired of the analysis I am too, look for another analyst, I will discharge you" and so she would be in her position of obedience, of submission, she would remain in the ego identification. As Urbaj affirms well and in accordance with what has already been consigned up to here regarding the transfer, beyond the particularity of this case that was brought up, the end of the analysis is the release from the prison of the transfer, the concern of the analysand only

with his own object *a* and not to refer to the object *a* of the analyst which only concerns the analyst himself. The end of the analysis comes from an act of the subject and not of the self (Urbaj, 2013)

In the analysis, it is decisive that the analysand is not identified to the analyst's *object a* and this as part of the analysand's identification with the symptom. The analyst does not put his *object a* at stake with that of the analysand and that is how the analysis is not a matter of intersubjectivity. Fundamental to the analysis are the analytical act that incites the position of the analysand, who is the one who actually performs the analytic work and the acts of the subject, the acts of being subjected to desire, to the unconscious, including the final acts that imply the end of the analysis itself. This is how the dimension of the act differs in a forceful way from the Derridian perspective that takes everything as mere text. Let us not forget, in addition, the dimension of the imaginary that also has its part, as we have already reviewed, in the handling of the transference (regarding the masks and the repositioning of the analyst).

Summarizing:

The analytic act, the act of the subject, the *object a* and the moment of conclusion are criteria that give psychoanalysis its own specificity with respect to Derrida's deconstructivist hermeneutics.

The analysis also has its clear specificity with respect to the other hermeneutics of the psi field and with respect to the positivism of this same field. I will expose this taking Vittorio Guidano's post-rationalist model as representative of said hermeneutics and the three generations of behaviorism as representatives of the aforementioned positivism.

The analytical act is based on the desire of the analyst and, in turn, the latter corresponds to, called by Jean Allouch, analytical raving. This raving, like that of psychosis, is about the division of the Other, of disbelief in the complete Other (Allouch, 2014). The analytical raving can be considered a raving from the perspective that vast majority of the tradition of western knowledge, and therefore hermeneutics and positivism, assume a complete Other. However, it differs from psychotic raving in that the analytic goes from transference to disbelief in the complete Other, while the raving of psychosis assumes the division of the Other from its own base.

To start from the transference towards disbelief in the complete Other is to start from the meaning contributed by the analysand towards the fracture of the same. The analytical act of the analyst, rather than pointing to the incongruity of the analysand's discourse, points to the fracture of the meaning of said discourse, pointing to the interrogation, by the analysand, about his own desire.

Let us take the lawyer's case from Reitter. Reitter, without making advance selections of material, allows the lawyer to unfold his speech and, in this way, reaches the point of expressing that fear of being hooked on the theater in his days as a university student. Reitter agrees on the analysand's desire to follow the path of the theater in correspondence with the analytical raving about the unconscious that splits via desire and, following what would be the characteristic procedure of the analysis, let us assume that Ritter does not postulate his inference to his analysand, but rather interrogates it with the aim of the analysand's desire "Are you afraid of getting hooked on the creative because you would lose an ineffective freedom, word for word,

absent from decisions and own projects, absent from the creative?" Let us note that the analysand can well identify for himself that he is precisely in consultation because he complains of not leaving the word for the word, of the absence of decisions and own projects in the face of what "has already been taken", namely, the absence of the creative and that, by the way, this which alludes to the fact that his desire points to the creative, is not on the route of identification to a virtual freedom that nevertheless is taken as unquestionable, but on the route to identification with that fears and avoids. That the subject of the unconscious occurs prompted by this question, by the fracture of meaning via the interrogation about desire, is something that will only be confirmed a posteriori (*nachträglich*). If this identification to the symptom is confirmed, precisely as identification, it will have the signature of the subject, the act of the subject, and not a "yes" or a "no" from the self.

The analyst is an analyst because it is a triggering instrument, the analytic act incites, the analysand is the analysand because it is he who does the work of analysis, the act of the subject is that of the subject to the unconscious (Lacan, 1968/2007). There is a question about the desire, not wanting "to control the determinations" towards an affirmative response from the client, there is no elaboration of a different and guaranteed meaning of a therapist to provoke changes in the client's meaning through arguments, by means of an identification sum of the therapist's self to the identifications that make up the consultant's ego. The subject's act is an act without guarantees; the analyst is not the one who would provide a substitute guarantor for the lawyer's virtual freedom that was taken as guarantor. The analyst's desire is a desire not for identity to his person but a desire for difference. There

is no person of the analyst, each analysand has his analyst as a trigger, as a formation of the unconscious; once the detonation, and as long as it is not a guarantor, the analyst becomes a waste.

Neither the analytical act nor the act of the subject can be foreseen. It is later that a certain act can be noticed or discarded as an analytical act, the same is so with the act of the subject. Let us assume that Ritter's analysand stops being a lawyer and goes on to dedicate himself to the theater; It will be to posteriori that this now dedicated to the theater will recognize or not this act as a result of his desire. The act of the subject is without guarantee and, likewise, it is the analytical act. Let us assume that the now dedicated to the theater came to recognize that act of dedicating himself to the theater as a result of his desire. So the analysis leads to unexpected and surprising culminations, not the result of an even more intelligent, gifted and, moreover, entrepreneur lawyer being reached and without those annoying subjective sensations of living word for word; This belongs to the scope of the results drawn as objective and predictable under the framework of any of the three generations of behaviorism and, with less rigidity but without that flavor of the unexpected and surprising, to the scope of the expected results under hermeneutics. There is no Other guarantor, complete, and the analytical culmination points to an identification to the loss and not the gain (the super-lawyer, or else, the lawyer who abandoned his meaning of not being productive for another more in line with such) that it assumes the unity of the self and / or of the meaning (s) and of a complete Other.

Neither the analytic act nor the act of the subject can be foreseen. It is later that a certain act can be noticed or discarded as an analytical

act, the same happens with the act of the subject. Let us suppose that Ritter's analysis ceases to be a lawyer to dedicate himself to the theater. It will be a posteriori that this now dedicated to the theater will recognize or not this act as a consequence of his desire. The act of the subject is without guarantee and, likewise, it is the analytical act. Suppose that the now devoted to the theater came to recognize that act of dedicating himself to the theater as a result of his desire. Thus, the analysis leads to unexpected and surprising culminations, not the result of reaching an even more intelligent, gifted and, moreover, entrepreneurial lawyer and without those annoying subjective sensations of living word for word. This belongs to the scope of the results drawn as objective and predictable within the framework of any of the three generations of behaviorism and, with less rigidity but without that unexpected and surprising flavor, within the scope of the results expected under hermeneutics. The analytical culmination points to an identification of the loss and not of the gain (the super-lawyer, or, the lawyer who abandoned his meaning of not being productive for another more in line with such).

Behaviorism, whether it is exercised on the basis of environmental reinforcers and punishments - first generation - (Skinner, 1989), on the basis of the internal mediating components that exist between the stimulus and the response - second generation - (Beck, 1975) or on the basis of retaking the environmental reinforcers and punishments of the immediate situation considering the internal components present or to be generated of the behavior - third generation - (Hayes, 2004) begins from a unit with certain incongruities, but without fundamental division, which is it would lead in concordance towards another

great unit still completely free of incongruities, at a high harmonic level with respect to what is demanded and coming from the rigid ideation of the behavioral therapist. *Behaviorism is predictable and planned, without identification with the surprising, the unexpected, the desire.*

Vittorio Guidano's post-rationalist model starts from not conferring a single meaning that corresponds to a reality. In this way, there would not be a universe but infinite - verses; and the individual, insofar as it is always self - referential (Varela, Maturana & Uribe, 1974), that is, any vision or version that it has about things always carries implicit information on principles assumed to arrive at the perception of a reality with order and regularity, can know its implicit principles of configuration of reality - in what contributes the discrepancies of meaning expressed by the post-rationalist therapist - and can change its principles to give it order to reality; change the meaning of him, the version of him (Guidano, 2007)

According to the post-rationalist model, it must be ensured that the individual himself is low knowledge - via discrepancies, an absolute knowledge is never reached - in order to change the meaning of him, the version of him. In other words, the individual can change to another unit, to another meaning, according to himself (Guidano, 2007) At the discretion of what? We are assuming a transcendental "according to himself" that, again, is without fundamental division and for which it would be necessary to discard complete units (meanings) and configure a complete unit according to the completeness of this assumption and assumed - according to himself - transcendental. With a - according to himself - without fundamental division, I would ask myself in an epistemological way, under what criteria would

one meaning be discarded to configure another without allusion to desire? To put it frankly, it is as if the post-rationalist model assumes a self behind the self, a transcendent unity that, without fundamental division, is presented with selves with external discrepancy with respect to it and that at whim can be configured a more self according to him. *Certainly, it would be an issue of reconfiguring the patient's ego by adding ego identifications from the therapist. Here again we start from a unit with incongruities, but without a fundamental division, which would become more congruent with a unit that has no incongruities, at a high harmonic level with respect to what is demanded, coming from a whimsical elucubration of the patient and at a high level suggested by the post-rationalist therapist.*

The caprice is a deceptive escape from the step towards desire (Lacan, 1958/2000), a symbolic trick to turn the law around and continue under the regiment of *jouissance*; caprice is a false change, a false transformation.

I want to end this section by pointing to the opening that it is not an issue of eliminating all considerations about the self or the meaning, because if such did not exist, how would the surprise, the unexpected, be possible? But I think that, based on the clinical vignettes that I have brought into consideration, it has been made explicit that the specificity of psychoanalysis is more about the unexpected, the surprise, the desire, and the specificity of positivism and the hermeneutics of the psi field is more about the unitary. I emphasize the term “more” because, as can be seen from what I have explained here, psychoanalysis, especially with the register of the imaginary, does not stop considering the unitary (the identification with the symptom must be assumed as given from a reduction to ego identifications and not as an absolute dissolution

to all ego identification), and the psi field does not stop considering the difference, although this is taken more as incongruity and not as a fundamental division. The criticism that is made of the psi field from this perspective of psychoanalysis is valid and the elucidation is valid that it is the different surplus value of psychoanalysis and the particular surplus value of the psi field what constitute the specificities of the one and the other. This is what I wanted to capture in the clinical vignettes that should be considered as models or exposure schemes and not as irremovable factual facts. In psychoanalysis, the multiplicity of paths that any treatment of the human and the subjective can take is well known.

Although when approaching the positivism of the psi field I have wanted to refer on this occasion to behaviorism in its three generations, it is worth mentioning briefly that the position of psychoanalysis (especially, as a treatment of the real) that I propose here towards behaviorism, it is similar to what would be the position vis-à-vis psychopharmacology and neurosciences.

I say similar because high-level researchers, in these areas of knowledge, usually delimit their field of study well and, although when they are talking about the neurochemical factor or the anatomical and physiological factor, they are under an approach that does not stop falling into a plus of the unitary, of a unit that is the sum of several factors, they do not pretend to monopolize all human affairs from their respective fields. Of course, they are very far from a position of plus over desire, the difference, indeed, neuroscientists of the highest rank, such as Gerald Edelman or Giulio Tononi have argued that consciousness and language escape the neuroscientific field as concerning, neuroscience could hardly

refer to a substrate of consciousness and language (Edelman and Tononi, 2000). Much of the pretense of hoarding all human affairs with psychopharmacology is promoted by the pharmaceutical industry (Leader, 2008) and much of wanting to cover everything human with neurosciences comes from scientism, from a fanatical and popular ideology of wanting to address everything from biologicism (Bassols, 2011).

On the social basis of the psi field

The notion of the psi field is based on illustration and, by the way, all positivism. The illustrated project aims at man's dominion over nature and over himself via the intellect and reason.

The idea of the illustration is to reduce everything to unity and, as we already stated here, this is the specificity of the psi field.

Reducing everything to unity via instrumental reason as a faculty that instrumentalizes the world is the foundation of reification, of the reification of the human that industrialization carries out. Human reification by industrialization receives the support of pure Kantian reason that is directed towards science and that finally wins over practical reason, also proposed by Kant himself, which would pretend to sustain morality on the sole basis of reason, mediating the categorical imperative (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1944/1972). It is clear, bearing in mind this perspective, that the specificity of the psi field corresponds to a form of the prevailing social bond: a bond that points out that man, with no other incongruities than that of a reason that may not yet be sufficiently developed, manage to consolidate his reason and reach the ideal unit of the system. This idealistic narcissistic bond rules in every sphere of society, in

the common man; the love of capitalist man is to lead the other and himself towards an ideal unity mediating his reason.

And what about the proposition that we now find ourselves in postmodernity? What about the propositions of Hans Gadamer, a pioneer of hermeneutics in the social sciences, who would rescue tradition from the enlightened preponderance of reason? It is about the dialectic of the enlightenment itself. Just as the so-called "liberal democracies" apparently oppose, in principle, totalitarianisms and, as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (1944/1972) well demonstrated, both the one and the other actually have their basis in the illustrated project, The same occurs with the apparent contraposition of principle between modernity and postmodernity, on pain of the latter proclaiming itself as an overcoming or unmasking of the enlightened project.

What is stated in the last paragraph deserves a good clarification. The illustration confesses contrary to the myth, being, however, the greatest myth of all. It would be enough to remember the first excursus of the work of Adorno and Horkheimer "*Dialectic of the illustration*" where it is clearly appreciated how the man of today would correspond to the mythical character Odiceo in the work of the Odicea attributed to Homer. Towards his return home, Odiceo completely resorts to his cunning and tricks to deceive all manner of beings, including the gods, in order to achieve his ultimate purpose.

The man in the illustration is a mythical character and in connection with Nietzsche's call to the myth itself. This last author, by the way, is much cited by Adorno and Horkheimer in their work, since Nietzsche advocates the contempt of the weak and, like Sade in his work Juliette or the prosperities of vice

(second excursus in “Dialectic of the illustration”), advocates contempt for the morality of repentance, love and compassion. The preponderance to which the illustration points leads to the vices where morality is reduced, vices that are made public under fascist totalitarianism and, I would add at this time, in the so-called “postmodernity”. The myth, the tradition (defended by the hermeneutical project) are not in opposition to the enlightened project, although the followers of such a hermeneutical project confessly declare themselves against such.

We pass from the considerations of Adorno and Horkheimer to those of a well-known psychoanalyst: Gerard Pommier. This last author, referring to religion understood as pointing towards an ideal unity, points out that religion as such would correspond to pre-modernity, secularized religion to modernity and religion that denies itself as a reference to postmodernity (Pommier, 2002). Would not post-rationality go from being the same instrumental rationality but narcissistically orchestrated as without the need to grasp as a reference or any reference? As is well expressed by what would be the specificity of hermeneutics in the psi field, a model such as the systemic - post-rationalist model marks a unit without fundamental division that would lead to an ideal unit largely in accordance with what is demanded from the ego identifications; only that it is claimed that said unity to which it is aimed "would lack the authoritarianism" of a single reality independent of man (on pain that it is aimed at the unity of a self, of a transcendent narcissism). Hermeneutics in the psi field would correspond to the same dominant social bond that I have already indicated, only with the narcissistic inflation that oneself and the other are not directed towards a single and general system unit, but towards the ideal unit

of transcendent narcissism while all the egos and all the positions are valid, for this the post-rationality (that is, the instrumental reason as a whim) mediates.

The psi field corresponds to the social bond of love. Of course, love as the subjection of the other, as the loss of the freedom of the other, and that of oneself and the subjection of oneself to the narcissism of identification with the unary trait or even an identification more tending to the ideal self. In a high level, this is the love that Pommier (2012) unmasks in his work “What does it mean to make love?”. Adorno and Horkheimer pointed out, paraphrasing the writings of many authors, how repentance, compassion and love are the criminalized feelings under the illustrated project (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1944/1972). Only it would be necessary to clarify that they are criminalized as long as they were out of ideal unity; otherwise, they are feelings that have been instrumentalized.

Adorno and Horkheimer resort to negative dialectics and brilliantly contribute to elucidating the plot of the illustrated project. In the midst of the negative dialectic they suggest that a viable way out of the illustrated plot, in terms of social organization (society, links, the relations of production that allude to those of power and domination), would be in the bet for those weaknesses that the same illustrated project criminalizes and is a fundamental division of a supposed ideal unit. Given that, as I already mentioned, these feelings can also be instrumentalized, here the contribution from psychoanalysis also comes into play. To bet on the fundamental division in the bond would be to bet on the surprise, on the unexpected and, by the way, with the signature of the identification of the person or those involved in the bond. This is the surprise that cannot be instrumentalized, unlike even

the “surprise” that series, comedies or dramatizations of the commercial television industry generate in the viewer.

The social presence of psychoanalysis

In truth, psychoanalysis by doing treatment deals with the subject of the treatment. In the same treatment the discourses proposed by Lacan are played, discourses that go beyond the word and are formalizations of the social bond. The treatment implies the social bond and thus the social, culture, language, power, are the competence of psychoanalysis and are played in the role of analyst. Elaborating on the thing in itself of the analytic practice is not reduced to elaborating on what happens with each analysand, but is elaboration of the subject of the social bond or discourse, and of the subject of power.

Hasn't this been the case since Freud's own work (Freud, 1921/1990)? The discourses proposed by Jacques Lacan is to deal with the subject of the social bond in areas that Freud had already paid for: the impossibility of governing (owner's discourse), of educating (university discourse), of analyzing (discourse of the analyst), and we add with Lacan the impossibility of making desires (hysterical discourse) and of making produce (capitalist discourse).

As has already been seen in this work, psychoanalysis, dealing with the treatment subject, is committed to the effective choice (*wirklichkeit*) of identification with the symptom. *Wirklichkeit* is, by the way, an expression that Freud used quite a bit and that goes unnoticed by readers of his work in a language other than German. The analyst who does not deal with the subjects of the social bond and of power is certainly not opting for effective

choice in these areas that fall within his function. The analyst who is not at the level of the subjectivity of his time should renounce (Lacan, 1953/2002).

Analytic practice is psychoanalysis in intention, and the symbolic elaboration of this and the constitution of theory, imaginary, is psychoanalysis in extension. This is what Lacan pointed out in his Proposal of October 9, 1967, he referred to the function of analyst, his function which is twofold: practice and elaborate on said practice. An analyst function that if it is no longer considered double would be this, in itself, the disappearance of the treatment, research and theory, which are the three pillars on which psychoanalysis is based (Freud, 1923/2002)

Elaborating on, for example, the capitalist discourse, dealing with the problems of power via, for example, *Zadig* - the body created by Jacques Alain Miller since 2017 to debate and define political positions from psychoanalysis without pretending to constitute a political party (Stiglitz, 2021) -, are not mere exercises for analysts who want to take care of such duties in your leisure time. *Zadig* is, in this regard, an instance that has been controversial among many of the same "analysts" from France and Spain. However, the function of analyst is the inseparability of psychoanalysis in intention and extension, and the latter dealing with the subject of the treatment, discourse and power.

To make to hysteria to discourse and the impossible to make delirious

In the course of this work, several propositions have already been expressed and it is necessary to recapitulate some in order to express others.

The specificity of psychoanalysis is at its surplus on the side of surprise, the unexpected, desire; while the specificity of the psi field is in its plus on the side of the unit, but with a very strong belie of what belongs to the division of the unit, to the point where a fundamental division of unit is denied. Psychoanalysis takes into consideration the unitary, but, certainly, its proposal is placed in a break with this conception. With this, the specificity of the treatment of the real, here proposed, is clarified in the face of positivism and the hermeneutics of the psi field.

Positivism and hermeneutics present notable differences, but at the point of interest in this writing and in the articulation of the two currents in the framework of the psi field, both currents belie the fundamental division of the unit and point towards another ideal unit that, expressing things clear, it is metaphysical in nature. When we examine the social basis of the notion of psi field, it is noticeable that, after all, the genealogies of the two movements are not so distant from each other, since it must be considered that the illustrated project was and continues to be a milestone in the historical evolution of humanity that, whatever the changes that continue to take place, leaves a distinguishable mark of a before and after it.

To the notion of the psi field corresponds, taking its social base, a form of the bond that is dominant in contemporary society or social organization. This dominant bond, whether in its confessionally modern version or in its confessionally postmodern version, consists of an assumption of integral narcissism, without fundamental breakdown, with incongruities that are expected to be overcome, and lead to integration with a higher ideal unity; The individual himself would arrive at such a unity, dragging his alter, via an

instrumentalized reason and feelings, whether the exercise of the faculties of reason and feelings is recognized or the reference to such is not even granted. The dominant bond, rather than monitoring, is a bond of absorption of the other; all towards an ideal unity, towards a standard, a homogenization. The dominant link is the standardizing and homogenizing nature of the proposed solutions to the problem of shaping society, both confessionally enlightened and confessionally postmodern.

The function of analyst is, in an intrinsic way, double, and here we continue with the propositions, psychoanalysis also has its corresponding link on a social basis. The incidence of psychoanalysis in the social sphere entails a break with the dominant bond via surprise, with identification and act on the surprise itself. This surprise - the one that cannot be instrumentalized - would mark the fundamental division in the unity of the bond. In this work, therefore, it has been concluded that the review of the analyst function consists in that said function must deal not only with the treatment subject but also with the social subject (or discourse) and the subject of power. The notion of the real is modified or rather broadened, since it involves, as part of the analyst's dealing with the subject of the social and of power, that said subjects (the participants of the link) play it more on the question side of the identification with the symptom that is not such without the act of the subject. This is properly a social link, in contrast to the narcissistic link that is at the social base as corresponding to the psi field (unfortunately the dominant one as yet). All these innovations that are proposed here as the axis of the specificity of the treatment of the real also contrast with the current discourse of this same treatment because in the present state of psychoanalytic discourse it has been considered that

dealing with the subject of the social and the Power is something optional to the function of analyst and inasmuch as it does not consider as an essential task of psychoanalysis dealing with the act of the subject of the social and of power in its commitment to identification with the symptom.

What is proposed in the last paragraph requires more details, since it marks an innovation, an epistemological renewal, and this is where we also continue with more proposals. To make the subject emerge for a moment in the general and daily social life in men and to the surprise that there is identification with the surprise and act of the subject is, obviously, of the order of the impossible, that is, if there is discourse of the analyst (the impossible of analysis) there is a discourse of propagation of raving (the impossible to make delirious)!

Is it illegitimate to consider that when Freud said to Jung, on the trip to North America, "they do not know that we have brought the plague", this was alluding to a discourse of analytical raving?

The effectiveness (wirklichkeit) of the presence of psychoanalysis in the social in dealing with the subjects of the treatment, of discourse and of politics is that the analyst insinuates the analytic raving, but insinuates it by dislodging from S1 (the place of the owner): the impossible to make delirious.

Why are psychoanalytic books available to the public? What are the articles for? What are the lectures for?... it is certainly neither to promote a wild psychoanalysis nor to spread a "psychoanalytic prophylaxis" that would be falling into the standardization of the dominant "social" bond. Rather, psychoanalysis has marginalized itself insofar as it has not become a plague. To deal with the subject of the discourse and the political subject is to insin-

uate the analytical raving in the social and political bond while at the same time insinuating the impossible of the analyst and the impossible of the leader. These two figures are not "people in themselves" but formations of the unconscious that can occur at a given moment and then will have to fall. As for everyday life, it is not that the neighbor, the partner, the friend or oneself is an analyst, but that, precisely, the surprise, the unexpected revelation, alludes to the division of integral narcissisms, to face to face with own desire. I will clarify even more what I am exposing.

The men who cannot be surprised are those who cannot question themselves. Although in this article I am not focused on dealing explicitly from the feminine angle, I am going to take two interesting accounts made by the analyst Miquel Bassols in his conference in San Telmo "*The feminine, beyond genders*" (Bassols, 2020)

The first story, taken from Lacan's own work, was a succinct summary of Alphonse Allais's work "A very Parisian drama." It is about a couple who, each suspecting the other's infidelity, write an anonymous letter to their partner inviting him (her) to a costume party. Both use the same stratagem, they invite each other to the same party and with the masks they are wearing, without recognizing each other, they go to a separate room for privacy; at the time of removing the masks, surprise! Neither he had been himself nor she had been herself and that is when they really fall in love with each other.

The second story is of a couple in which each one is being unfaithful to the other on the internet. The moment comes when each of them is going to meet their virtual partner for the first time and, when this happens, it is put on the scene that the man's virtual partner was his same daily partner and the same, of course,


in terms of to her. They accuse each other and go to trial.

With these two stories Bassols deals with the theme of his lecture; but I am interested, taking care of the theme of this present article, to indicate that the difference in outcome between one couple and another is in the effective surprise (*wirklichkeit*) of the first in contrast to the second. Analytical raving is raving of fundamental division. In the first couple there is self-questioning, the masks that each one had that each one was faithful fall and the masks that were awarded to each other that the other was a traitor fall. Neither he had been himself nor she had been herself, and identification occurs to breakdown, to surprise, to the unexpected; it is, act of the subject, when they truly fall in love. The unconscious formations of the faithful self and the other traitor fell and, when resignification (*après coup*) occurs, the unconscious formations of lovers and loved ones occur. In the second couple, surprise is not surprise (there is no identification to it with the stamp of the


act that would correspond to it), it is something that is instrumentalized to continue that link of attack on the other and defense of oneself; and it is that instead of having question, fracture, recognition of castration, what there is belie and closure of meaning.

The questioning, typical of the analytical raving, goes hand in hand with the fall of the owner signifiers. Analysis will always be analysis; But if psychoanalysis also humbly contributes with its insinuation of raving in the social and political, so that the man of today more inclined to the closure of meaning is inclined to question himself, this small contribution is his specificity in the social and political, its coming out from marginalization as a current, its contribution to a form of dissident bond and, perhaps from there, its contribution to a dim glimpse of a new social organization, of a new society different from the confessedly enlightened or confessedly postmodern.


Insinuating raving, the impossible to make delirious, is the analyst's questioning to the identifications of the subject of social action, of the social act, of the political action




Capitalist discourse (figure 1)



impossible to make delirious (figure 2)



Analyst discourse (figure 3)



Social bond (figure 4)

and the political act. Our actions - which are those in apparent correspondence with our images and our thoughts - and our acts - which are those that are in obvious diachrony with our images and thoughts - which imply a link, adjust to a certain identification or another. The analyst, when asking about desire as that which splits or divides in a fundamental way and in act the subject of social and political actions and acts, makes said subject address the analyst as a knowledge (S2) that has something what to say, what to hint, about the fundamental division of the imaginary unit (figure 2).

The impossible to make delirious as a social and political act of the analyst corresponds to the rotations operated on the capitalist discourse (figure 1) as well as the discourse of the analyst (figure 3) corresponds to the rotations operated on the discourse of the owner. The impossible to make delirious marks, next to make to hysteria to discourse, the beginning of analysis; marks the first operations of the analytic act.

Lacan's dissertation on to make to hysteria to discourse is found in *Seminar 17* on the reverse of psychoanalysis and, as is well known, it does not refer to the person of the hysterical analysand but to the question of the symptom as concerning oneself. And it is that, certainly, what Lacan calls "the unidentified subject" in his "Intervention on the Pass" in Deauville (Lacan, 1978) alludes, in Lacan's own words, "to the one who tends too much to his unity". Of course, moving someone from his position as an unidentified subject implies moving him to concern himself in his question about his symptom. However, this is still not enough. Lacan, in this same writing about the "Intervention on the Pass", pointed out, regarding the unidentified subject that "it would be necessary to explain to him that he is not

one, and it is in that the analyst could be of use for something".

In the same "Intervention on the Pass" Lacan points out that it is the neurotic - psychotic who demands analysis, who seeks and believes in psychoanalysts. Certainly, it is the neurotic and not the psychotic who usually looks for an analyst, but at the same time, not just any neurotic demands analysis; it is an "absolutely crazy story" that certain neurotics believe in analysts and seek them out. This is where we place my proposal of this social bond on "the impossible to make delirious" that derives from the rotations of the capitalist discourse. Insinuate the raving, the one that is not one via the questioning of the desire that is not divorced from the act and from the identification; this is the impossible to make delirious that would move the unidentified subject from his place.

The analyst's discourse (figure 3) shows us how precisely the analyst puts himself in the place of lack, of interrogation, in front of the divided symptomatic subject, giving the latter a position in front of his desire and making him locate knowledge about what that lacks and divides on the side of the analyst who, in turn, will not fall into the trap of locating himself in that knowledge because that would precisely remove him from the place of lack. In order for the initial location of the analyst to be possible in the place of the lack, of the person who interrogates the analysand, not only the analysand must already question himself about his symptom as something with which himself remains concerned (to make to hysteria to discourse), but also the analyst is the director of the question insofar as he has been located as someone who is directed towards something that divides the analysand (desire) and who places the analysand as crossed or divided in a fundamental way and

giving the analyst knowledge about that fundamental division (paranoisation of the discourse), knowing in which, by the way, the analyst will not fall into the trap of identifying with it (impossible to make delirious). All this connotes the transference, the sSs (*subject Supposed to know*) that on the side of the analysand involves the "what do you wish about me?" (more on the hysterical side), but also the "what do you know about me?" (more of the paranoid side) that is at the base of human knowledge. It is worth saying that the "what do you know about me?" it constitutes one more of the paranoid side without being paranoia (analytical raving) since after all "he who wants to does not become crazy" (Lacan, 1946/2010) and the discourse of the impossible to make delirious is precisely that and not a "discourse of psychosis" which is known that psychosis is just non-discourse itself.

Now it is possible to say something about the why of the lectures, books, articles, etc., of psychoanalysis addressed to the public: it's why must be aimed at the impossible to make delirious, at the hint of analytical raving as I have exposed it. The analyst has to be the one who questions the identifications of the possible subjects of the treatment and, as I already mentioned, of the subjects that are linked, of the subjects of social and political actions and acts, via the impossible to make delirious. Dealing with the bonds of couples, brought up in connection with that lecture by Miquel Bassols, it is worth noting that the truly social and dissident bond of the first couple, in contrast to the narcissistic and normalizing bond of the second, may be precisely a bond that has become dissident in part due to the possible social contribution of analysts that they have insinuated in the social the analytical raving. The impossible to make delir-

ious is to promote effective surprise (*wirklichkeit*) since the analytical raving about the fundamental division points towards the impossible of symbolically closing our identification, of defining ourselves fully. This same insinuation of raving, this psychoanalytic plague, has to be on the institutions and social and political movements, which from their very inaugural nomination and definition of actions would be positioning themselves as that "unidentified subject that tends too much to its unity"; The analyst has to question the identifications of institutions and movements, asking for desire as that which breaks those identifications that contain the very name of institutions and movements and their guidelines in terms of mission and objectives.

The genuinely social bond, represented by the couple in Alfonse Allais's story, consists of the agent - unit that knows himself in division, of knowledge that addresses the other as a question, and that other that has been located as a question gives an account of his own desire that leads the agent-unit to remain in a position of split, of divided in a fundamental way. Here we have the recognition of the castration of both the one and the other. The genuinely social bond also appears as a rotation of the capitalist discourse (figure 4).

Final comment

Psychoanalysis does not imply the total discarding of the unitary and the psi field would consider incongruities in its minor unit (not in the ideal), with a strong belie of the fundamental division. The same thing is that both one position and the other, although they do not imply the total annihilation of their counterpart, they are still antagonistic positions, they are not complementary in the meaning in which the complementary term is

usually understood. How is complementarity usually assumed? With the belief that if a problem is dealt with by joining the different specificities of one and the other, a more appropriate solution of the problem is reached and ... this may be true in many cases, but it is left aside that neither the problem is exhausted in any solution, and neither does the one and the other of the disciplines that have been involved in the solution. This is because there is no "full complementarity" and whatever the solutions, they will always have the mark of a plus that will be on one side or the other, on the side of the specificity of psychoanalysis or on the side of the psi field. I argue that the solutions to the problems of the human, of the subjective, must be on the side of the specificity of psychoanalysis.

What is exposed in this work are the different reaches of the treatment specificity of the real, here proposed and renewed, with respect to those of the psi field; it is also the basic critique of the treatment of the real to the psi field.

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